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Ruth Ann Jefferies v. Wilbur R. Jefferies
Case no. 940373CA

1-3103*3 _

DOCKET NO

Dear Clerk:
Pursuant to Rule 24(i) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Ruth Ann Jefferies
submits the following supplemental authority. The citation of the case is Jeffcoat v. Jeffcoat,
1994 W.L. 665603 (Md. App. 1994). This case pertains to the issues outlined in Ms. Jefferies'
brief at pages 16-21. Specifically, Jeffcoat v. Jeffcoat, in point I of the opinion, from page 2
to page 5, analyzes the issue addressed in point IV of Ms. Jefferies' brief.
Sincerely,
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL P.C.

David S. Dolowitz
DSD:mm
Enclosure
cc:
Clark W. Sessions, Esq. (w/enc.)
Jay W. Butler, Esq.
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James W. JEFFCOAT.
No. 6, Sept. Term, 1994.
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
Nov. 30, 1994.
Michael Hart Davis (Shirley A. Lindsey and
Bregel, Kerr, Davis & Dantes, on the brief),
Towson, for appellant.
Julie Ellen Landau, Baltimore, for appellee.
Argued before
MURPHY, JJ.

ALPERT,

FISCHER

and

FISCHER, Judge.
*1 Pamela H. Jeff coat appeals from a judgment of
the Circuit Court for Baltimore County arising out
of divorce proceedings brought by her against James
W. Jeff coat, appellee.
In this appeal, appellant raises the following
issues:
I. Did the court err by not including some of the
value of marital property dissipated by appellee
after separation and before trial in the value of
marital property from which it could make a
monetary award when appellee, immediately upon
separation, removed virtually all of the parties'
jointly titled liquid assets from their joint names
to an account in his name alone and then over the
next 13 months spent substantially all those funds?
II. Did the court err in finding that a portion of
life insurance proceeds paid more than two years
prior to trial were non-marital when: 1) there was
no proof of a gift of the policy, 2) there was no
allegation that the policy had any value at the time
of the transfer, 3) the policy was maintained only
by marital funds, 4) there was no tracing of the
policy proceeds to any existing asset, 5) the
proceeds of the policy were commingled with
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marital property when received two years before
trial, and 6) the commingled proceeds were
further commingled with other marital assets by
appellee?
III. Is it contrary to the Family Law Statute to
order the parties to pay work related day care
expenses on the basis of their pro rata incomes
after adjustment of their incomes for child
support, and did the court err in not making a
finding regarding the parties' incomes when the
amount of income was disputed?
IV. Did the trial court err by not properly
calculating the monetary award using the three
step process of (1) identifying marital property,
(2) valuing marital property, and (3) granting a
monetary award?
Facts
The parties married in 1977, and two children
were born of the marriage, James Richard, born in
1983, and Evan Cleave, born in 1989. Appellant
insists the union was problematic from its outset.
Appellee contends there were few stresses in the
marriage until 1991, when appellee began law
school. In 1991, appellee left the family home,
apparently at appellant's suggestion. At a meeting
on or about April 27, 1992, appellant informed
appellee that she desired a divorce.
Appellee
responded by returning to live in the family home.
Appellant's attorney threatened court action if
appellee did not leave the family home and appellee
complied.
During the course of the marriage, the parties
were able to accumulate substantial assets.
According to appellant, their net worth totalled
$763,000 at the time of separation. Upon leaving,
appellee withdrew joint funds totaling approximately
$218,000 and placed them in his name alone. He
also borrowed the maximum amount possible on
their home equity line of credit, approximately
$82,000. Appellee placed these funds in a bank
account in his name. In addition to his control of
the parties' joint funds, appellant avers that appellee
had income from earnings and other sources totaling
$88,000. Appellant alleges appellee spent almost
$300,000 during the one year period of the parties'
separation. According to appellant, appellee had
spent all but approximately $68,000 of the joint
funds by the trial date.
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*2 On October 23, 1979, appellee's father
transferred the ownership of Metropolitan Life
Insurance Policy # 716102822 PR on the father's
life to appellee. When transferred, the policy was
subject to a loan of $6,494. Appellee received
$41,617.69 from Metropolitan Life upon his
father's death in 1991. The proceeds from the
insurance policy were placed in a joint checking
account and, after the separation, in an account in
appellee's name.
The trial court ruled that appellant could only
receive one half of $17,000 in premiums paid on the
policy during the course of the marriage. The
remainder of the insurance policy was deemed by
the trial court to be non-marital property of
appellee.
A monetary award of $29,473 was
granted to appellant. Appellee was permitted to
retain the proceeds of the insurance policy on
appellee's deceased father as non-marital funds.
I.
[1] Appellant's contention that the court erred in
failing to find that appellee dissipated marital funds
rests primarily on an allegation that the trial judge
used an incorrect standard in evaluating appellee's
actions in spending marital monies.
Appellant
contends that the trial judge required that appellant
prove fraud in order to show dissipation of assets
had taken place. In Sharp v. Sharp, 58 Md.App.
386, 399, 473 A.2d 499 (1984), writing for this
Court, Judge Alpert stated:
[W]here a chancellor finds that property was
intentionally dissipated in order to avoid inclusion
of that property towards consideration of a
monetary award, such intentional dissipation is no
more than a fraud on marital rights, see Levin v.
Levin, 166 Md. 451, 453[, 171 A. 77] (1934).
This correct statement of the law was expressed
slightly differently in Ross v. Ross, 90 Md.App.
176, 190, 600 A.2d 891, vacated on other grounds,
327 Md. 101, 607 A.2d 933 (1992), wherein we
observed:
When a court finds that property was dissipated to
the point of being a fraud on marital rights, it
should consider the dissipated property as extant
to be valued with other existing marital property.
The quoted language in Ross apparently led the
trial court in this case to say "I can't find in this
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case, based on the evidence I have heard, that there
was a use of marital funds such as would constitute a
fraud on the marital rights of the parties, and,
therefore, I grant the motion on the issue of
dissipation of assets."
[2] It appears the court believed it had to find
fraud before it could find dissipation of marital
funds. Fraud can only be found by clear and
convincing evidence. Aeropesca Ltd. v. Butler
Aviation International, Inc., 44 Md.App. 610, 623,
411 A.2d 1055 (1980). The same quantum of
proof, clear and convincing evidence, is necessary to
establish constructive fraud.
Dixon v. Process
Corp., 38 Md.App. 644, 657, 382 A.2d 893
(1978). The trial court's finding is understandable
in view of the holding in Ross, supra, relied upon
by the trial court. Upon reflection, however, we see
no adequate reason to require a higher degree of
proof to establish dissipation than any other aspect
of marital property. Under a proper standard, the
trial court should be able to find dissipation by a
preponderance of the evidence.
*3 The case at bar is a perfect illustration of the
injustice that may result by imposing an
unreasonable burden of proof on a party who
accuses the other of dissipation of assets. The
parties in this case over a period of less than fifteen
years accumulated substantial assets; although both
were employed, neither had a large income. In spite
of the expense of raising two children, and even
sending them to private schools, they had acquired a
net worth of over $760,000. It is clear that they
were able to accomplish this by hard work,
frugality,
and
sound
fiscal
management.
Notwithstanding this past record of sound fiscal
management, in one year following the separation of
the parties, appellee spent almost $300,000 of the
parties' money.
This should be sufficient to
establish a prima facie case of dissipation.
Many state courts have considered dissipation of
marital assets in determining the division of marital
property. In Sharp v. Sharp, 58 Md.App. 386, 473
A.2d 499 (1984), this Court held that
where a chancellor finds that property was
intentionally dissipated in order to avoid inclusion
of that property towards a consideration of a
monetary award, such intentional dissipation is no
more than a fraud on marital rights, see Levin v.
Levin, 166 Md. 451, 453, 171 A. 77 (1934), and
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the chancellor should consider the dissipated
property as extant marital property ... to be valued
with other existing marital property.
Sharp, 58 Md.App. at 399, 473 A.2d 499. In its
discussion of dissipation, the Court examined other
jurisdictions that have addressed intentional
dissipation of marital assets for the purpose of
avoiding equitable distribution.
Foremost is
Illinois, which has statutory law expressly providing
that a chancellor in dividing marital property should
consider dissipation of assets. 111.Ann.Stat. ch. 40,
§ 503(c)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1980 Vol., 1983-84
Cum.Supp.). This Court, in Sharp, 58 Md.App. at
401, 473 A.2d 499, cited Klingberg v. Klingberg,
68 Ill.App.3d 513, 25 Ill.Dec. 246, 250, 386
N.E.2d 517, 521 (1979), for the proposition that
"[dissipation may be found where one spouse uses
marital property for his or her own benefit for a
purpose unrelated to the marriage at a time where
the marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable
breakdown."
A number of states have statutes that specifically
list dissipation of assets or fraudulent conveyances
as a factor for the court to consider. Lawrence J.
Golden, Equitable Distribution of Property, § 8.15
(1983, 1993 Cum.Supp.) (listing Arizona, Illinois,
Indiana, Montana, and West Virginia).
Some states that have addressed dissipation of
marital assets have followed Illinois law. Courts
generally seem to adopt the Illinois Court's
definition of dissipation. See e.g., Monte v. Monte,
212
NJ.Super.
557,
515
A.2d
1233
(Ct.App.Div.1986);
Clements v. Clements, 10
Va.App. 580, 397 S.E.2d 257 (1990).
In Melrod v. Melrod, 83 Md.App. 180, 574 A.2d
1, cert, denied, 321 Md. 67, 580 A.2d 1077
(1990), this Court held that there was no evidence
suggesting that the husband had dissipated proceeds
from a sale of a partnership in order to deprive the
wife of her marital rights. Melrod, 83 Md.App. at
194, 574 A.2d 1. This suggests that, to prove
dissipation, the party claiming dissipation must
present affirmative evidence. In Rock v. Rock, 86
Md.App. 598, 587 A.2d 1133 (1991), this Court
placed the burden on the dissipating spouse. Rock,
86 Md.App. at 619-620, 587 A.2d 1133. Recently,
in Ross v. Ross, 90 Md.App. 176, 190, 600 A.2d
891 (1992), this Court cited Sharp and held that
"[t]he spouse alleging dissipation has the burden of
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proving dissipation and the value of such property."
*4 Other courts disagree as to who bears the
burden of proving the purpose of a conveyance. In
some states, once the injured spouse makes a prima
facie case that marital funds were spent once the
marriage was breaking up, the burden shifts to the
dissipating spouse to prove that the funds were spent
for a proper purpose. Golden, at 375-376 (1993
Supp.).
In In re Marriage of Partyka, 158
Ill.App.3d 545, 110 Ill.Dec. 499, 511 N.E.2d 676
(1987), the court held:
Once it is established that one party has liquidated
marital assets, the party charged with dissipation
msut establish by clear and specific evidence how
the funds were spent;
general and vague
statements that they were spent on marital
expenses or bills are inadequate to avoid a finding
of dissipation.
Partyka, 110 Ill.Dec. at 503, 511 N.E.2d at 680
(citing In re Marriage of Smith, 128 Ill.App.3d
1017, 84 Ill.Dec. 242, 471 N.E.2d 1008 (1984)).
In In re Marriage of Smith, 128 Ill.App.3d 1017, 84
Ill.Dec. 242, 471 N.E.2d 1008 (1984), the Illinois
court examined many of its own opinions as well as
the decisions of other jurisdictions, including
Barriger v. Barriger, 514 S.W.2d 114 (Ky.1974),
Cooksey v. Cooksey, 280 S.C. 347, 312 S.E.2d 581
(1984), and E.E.C. v. E.J.C., 457 A.2d 688
(Del. 1983), in order to determine that the burden of
proof is on the party charged with the dissipation.
More recently, the court noted:
Once a prima facie case of dissipation is made, the
party charged with dissipation must establish by
clear and convincing evidence how the funds were
spent; general and vague statements are not
enough.
In re Marriage of Murphy, 259 111.App.3d 336, 197
Ill.Dec. 671, 673, 631 N.E.2d 893, 895 (1994).
Illinois appears to be the only state requiring the
dissipating spouse to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the funds were used for a marital
purpose. See Golden, at 384 (1993 Supp.).
Whereas in Illinois the dissipating spouse must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
property was not dissipated, other states require
proof only by a preponderance of the evidence. In
Manaker v. Manaker, 11 Conn.App. 653, 528
A.2d 1170 (1987), the Connecticut court held that
the "party which has control over marital assets and
is charged with their dissipation has the burden of
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accounting for those assets." The court continued,
"This burden is met by a preponderance of the
evidence." Manaker, 528 A.2d at 1173. The
Connecticut court referred to In re Marriage of
Smith, 128 Dl.App.3d 1017, 84 Ill.Dec. 242, 471
N.E.2d 1008 (1984), and opined that the Illinois
court's use of the language of "clear and specific
evidence" referred to "the probative value of
evidence and not the quantum of the evidence which
was necessary to sustain the burden of proof."
Manaker, 528 A.2d at 1173.
The Court of Appeals of Virginia, in Clements v.
Clements, 10 Va.App. 580, 397 S.E.2d 257 (1990),
relied on Illinois law to define dissipation. Citing In
re Marriage of Smith, 128 Ill.App.3d 1017, 84
Ill.Dec. 242, 471 N.E.2d 1008 (1984) and Manaker
v. Manaker, 11 Conn.App. 653, 528 A.2d 1170
(1987), the court stated that once the aggrieved
spouse shows marital funds were either withdrawn
or used after the breakdown, the burden rests with
the party charged with the dissipation to prove the
money was spent for a proper purpose. Clements,
397 S.E.2d at 261. The court then held that the
burden is on the dissipating spouse to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the funds were
used for some proper purpose. Clements, 397
S.E.2dat261.
*5 Although some courts refer to dissipation of
marital assets as a fraudulent conveyance, they do
not seem to require that the injured spouse prove
dissipation by an elevated standard. See Monte v.
Monte, 212 NJ.Super. 557, 515 A.2d 1233 (1986)
(citing Sharp and holding that intentional dissipation
is no more than a fraud on marital rights); Daniels
v. Daniels, 557 S.W.2d 702, 705 (Mo.App.1977)
("This court should look through his transparent
maneuver just as courts have always disregarded
fraudulent conveyances employed to hinder and
delay creditors.");
Barriger v. Barriger, 514
S.W.2d 114 (Ky. 1974).
A survey of case law does not support the
argument that the injured spouse must prove the
dissipation of assets by clear and convincing
evidence. To analogize dissipation of assets to be a
fraud on marital rights does not require a standard
any higher than is used for any other aspect of
marital property. In Sharp, the Court cited Colburn
v. Colburn, 15 Md.App. 503, 292 A.2d 121 (1972).
In Colburn, the Court held that the purpose of the
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husband's acts was to impoverish himself
voluntarily "so as to fraudulently deprive his wife of
her claim for alimony." Colburn, 15 Md.App. at
515-516, 292 A.2d 121. The Sharp Court then
stated that, even though Colburn dealt with alimony,
there was no reason why the same principles
involving fraud and intentional dissipation could not
be applied to the determination of a monetary
award. Sharp, 58 Md.App. at 400, 473 A.2d 499.
[3] The burden of persuasion and the initial
burden of production in showing dissipation is on
the party making the allegation. Choate v. Choate,
97 Md.App. 347, 366, 629 A.2d 1304 (1993). That
party retains throughout the burden of persuading
the court that funds have been dissipated, but after
that party establishes a prima facie case that monies
have been dissipated, i.e. expended for the principal
purpose of reducing the funds available for equitable
distribution, the burden shifts to the party who spent
the money to produce evidence sufficient to show
that the expenditures were appropriate.
[4] It appears that appellant has established a
prima facie showing of dissipation. The burden is
now upon appellee to produce evidence of the bona
fides of his expenditures. Appellee's expenditures
should be evaluated by the court to determine
whether dissipation has taken place. The court must
determine whether joint funds have been spent for
other than family purposes with the intention of
reducing the amount of money available to the court
for equitable distribution. If the court finds that
monies have been dissipated, the party responsible
should bear the loss.
II.
[5] In 1979, Cyril Jeffcoat, appellee's father,
assigned ownership of a life insurance policy on
Cyril's life to appellee. Appellant contends that the
proceeds of the policy are marital property because
the transfer instruments indicate the policy was
transferred "for value received." Appellee testified
the policy was a gift from his father, and the trial
court so found. We do not believe that the trial
judge was clearly erroneous in reaching the
conclusion that the policy was a gift and, therefore,
non-marital property. When received, the policy
was subject to a loan. This loan was repaid with
marital funds, and the policy premiums were paid
with marital funds. The court credited appellant
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with one-half of the approximately $17,000 in
premiums paid and deemed that the remainder of the
$41,617 received was the non-marital property of
appellee. Upon receipt of the policy proceeds after
Cyril's death, appellee placed the proceeds in a T.
Rowe Price account along with other marital funds.
*6 [6] During the course of the separation,
appellee took control of all of the liquid assets of the
parties, approximately $200,000. He put those
assets in T. Rowe Price accounts. It appears from
the evidence that the proceeds of the insurance
policy were commingled with marital funds of the
parties. The trial court credited appellant with onehalf of the premiums paid from marital funds, and
permitted appellee to trace the remaining $41,617 in
the T. Rowe Price account as non-marital funds of
appellee. It appears to us that, in doing so, the
court erred.
At the time the Rule S74 schedule was filed, there
was $67,927 in T. Rowe Price account #
610099506-4. The court found that $41,617 of
those funds were Cyril's life insurance proceeds.
The fallacy in this approach is the assumption that
appellee, after commingling the $41,617 along with
substantial marital funds in a single account, spent
only the marital funds. This is not possible. Since
the marital and non-marital funds were commingled,
it is impossible to trace $41,617 as non-marital
funds.
In May, 1992, the account into which
appellee deposited the proceeds of insurance
contained $262,113. At the time of trial, the
account contained $67,927. In Melrod v. Melrod,
83 Md.App. 180, 187, 574 A.2d 1 (1990), Judge
Bloom, writing for this Court, stated:
Property acquired by purchase during the marriage
and not excluded by valid agreement between the
parties, is marital property unless it can be traced
directly to a nonmarital source of funds or
property. FL § 8-201(e)(2)(iv) is quite specific;
it excludes from marital property any property
acquired during the marriage that is directly
traceable to a non marital source.
'Directly
traceable' is not synonymous with 'attributable.'
Since Mr. Melrod commingled his income from
non-marital sources with his marital income, no
specific sum of money used to acquire property or
reduce an indebtedness on any property can be
directly traced to any source. This inability to
trace property acquired during the marriage
directly to a non-marital source simply means that
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all property so acquired was marital property.
(Citation omitted. Emphasis in original.)
Because the insurance proceeds were commingled
with marital funds in an account that at one time
totalled $262,113, and the commingled funds were
spent down to $67,927 at the time of trial, it is
impossible to trace any of the remaining funds as
non-marital.
III.
[7] The trial judge ordered appellee to pay child
support of $300 per month for each child, a total of
$600. Appellant does not take issue with the $600
in child support ordered by the court. In a separate
provision, the judge ordered the parties to divide, in
proportion to their respective incomes, day care
expenses and summer camp expenses. He defined
income to include appellant's receipt of alimony and
child support. Appellant objects because the trial
court permitted appellee to deduct child support
from his income and add the amount to appellant's
income in determining each of their adjusted
incomes. Appellant agrees that preexisting child
support may be deducted, but contends that is not
applicable in this case.
*7 It appears that appellant is correct. The trial
judge's method improperly determines the parties'
income. Appellee's income is diminished while
appellant's income is increased. This method of
analysis alters to appellant's disadvantage the
proportion that each must pay. In addition, this is
contrary to Md.Code (1984, 1991 Repl.Vol., 1994
Cum.Supp.), § 12-204(a)(2)(ii) of the Family Law
Article, which permits alimony payments, not child
support, to be deducted from and credited to
income.
In addition, appellant complains that the trial
court improperly calculated appellee's income by
failing to consider his bonus and the value of certain
benefits. It is not clear to us whether the trial judge
considered those aspects.
On remand, the trial judge should recompute the
child support based upon the actual incomes of the
parties, as found by the trial judge, and include in
the amount of child support awarded an appropriate
amount for day care and related expenses.
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IV.
[8] Appellant avers that the trial court erred in
fixing the monetary award in a number of areas.
Appellant notes that the judge failed to utilize the
three-step process in determining a monetary award
as set forth in Md. Code (1984, 1991 Repl.Vol.), §
8-205 of the Family Law Article. As explained in
Schweizer v. Schweizer, 301 Md. 626, 629-630,
484 A.2d 267 (1984), the three-step process
requires:
(1) [T]he court shall determine which property is
marital property.... § 8-203(a).
(2) The court shall determine the value of all
marital property. § 8-204.
(3) [Upon compliance with (1) and (2) ], the court
may grant a monetary award as an adjustment of
the equities and rights of the parties concerning
marital property, whether or not alimony is
awarded. The court shall determine the amount
and the method of payment of a monetary
award.... § 8-205(a).
Appellant contends that the trial judge, in making
the monetary award, granted appellant an equal
division in certain assets but, without explanation,
overlooked other assets. For example, the judge
disposed of $41,617 in insurance proceeds
(previously discussed in section II) but ignored the
$26,310 remaining in the account, effectively
leaving it with appellee. Appellant also refers to a
promissory note in appellee's name that the court
failed to address. Appellant also contends that the
disputed value of a Provident Savings Bank account
# 2091364 was overlooked. Appellant claims the
court did not address the dispute over furnishings
located at 12 Jones Valley Circle, appellee's
residence, valued at $5,000 by appellee and $10,000
by appellant. In addition, appellee referred in his
testimony to "cash on hand" and cash in Maryland
National Bank totalling $14,730, which the court
failed to consider.
Appellee, on the other hand, insists that the
equitable division does not need to be equal.
Appellee maintains the trial judge followed the
required steps.
It appears from our review of the record that the
trial judge may have inadvertently overlooked
certain assets. His failure to refer in any way to the
items appellant claims were overlooked lends
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credence to appellant's assertion that these items,
and perhaps others, were overlooked. Since this
case is being remanded for the trial judge to
reconsider the dissipation aspect, it is appropriate
for the trial court to reaccomplish the making of an
appropriate monetary award taking into account all
of the parties' marital property.
V.
*8 [9] Appellee has raised two issues in his brief
for us to consider. Appellee asserts that the trial
judge abused his discretion in awarding
rehabilitative alimony to appellant.
Appellee
complains that the trial judge awarded appellant
$1,000 per month in rehabilitative alimony in the
absence of a showing that she has a need or intention
to rehabilitate herself.
Appellee cites Holston v. Holston, 58 Md.App.
308, 473 A.2d 459, cert, denied, 300 Md. 484,
479 A.2d 372 (1984) and Hull v. Hull, 83 Md.App.
218, 574 A.2d 20, cert, denied, 321 Md. 67, 580
A.2d 1077 (1990). We do not believe the cases
cited support appellee's position. In Holston, this
Court reversed the chancellor who had ordered
rehabilitative alimony. The Holston Court ordered
that the chancellor grant indefinite alimony. In
Hull, the chancellor had denied alimony and we
affirmed, saying, "At the time of trial, therefore, the
Wife had anticipated assets of $1,100,000. As her
counsel conceded during the trial, she was self
supporting.... We find no fault with Judge Heise's
decision that alimony was not required in this case."
In the case at bar, the chancellor had before him a
financial statement setting out appellant's monthly
net income at $2,075 and monthly living expenses
of $6,719. This was sufficient evidence to foreclose
a holding on our part that the chancellor abused his
discretion by awarding rehabilitative alimony to
appellant.
VI.
[10] Appellee's last objection is well taken. He
states that the parties acquired EE bonds during their
marriage, some titled in joint names and some in
appellee's name alone. The trial judge ordered that
the bonds be equally divided between the parties.
Appellee objects because the court cannot transfer
ownership from one party to another. Blake v.
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Blake, 81 Md.App. 712, 569 A.2d 724 (1990).
Appellee states, and we agree, "the appropriate
process would be to determine whether or not the
property is marital and pursuant to Md.Code Ann.,
Fam.Law § 8-203, value the property. Then the
court should consider the factors set forth in
Md.Code Ann. Fam. Law § 8-205 as to whether or
not a monetary award should be made to compensate
one or the other party for any inequity resulting
from a division of the EE bonds according to title."
The question of the bonds should be considered
along with the other items of marital property
belonging to the parties.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND
REVERSED IN PART. CASE REMANDED TO
THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE
COUNTY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.
END OF DOCUMENT
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